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HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE TOXIC
TORTS IMPLICATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN NEW
ORLEANS
L. DARNELL

WEEDEN*

INTRODUCTION

The recent damage to lives and property in New Orleans
would not have happened but for Hurricane Katrina's unwelcome
The hurricane and its aftermath have
visit to that city.
tremendous implications for general tort law.1 The English word
"tort" is derived from the French word "tort," which is defined as a
harm or wrong.2 A tort consists of a civil wrong that is not a
breach of contract, and is granted a remedy under the law.3 A
basic principle of tort law is that every person owes a duty to
others to function in a way that does not cause harm to another.4
When one breaches that duty, one could be liable for monetary
damages if an individual injured as a result of the tort chooses to
file a lawsuit.5
This article will discuss a body of law that has been identified
as the law of toxic torts. One commentator describes toxic tort law
as a modification of traditional tort law; it addresses the
hazardous community or workplace conditions resulting from the
manufacture and use of toxic substances.6 Toxic tort law differs
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Scott C. Whitney, Expediting Productive Reuse Of Superfund Sites:
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from state to state because state legislatures and courts adopt
rules unique to each state. This can create a lack of uniformity in
providing plaintiffs with an appropriate remedy for harm
suffered.7
Part I of this article will describe the extent of compensatory
damages available in toxic tort litigation. Part II will discuss the
environmental justice undertone of Katrina for those seeking toxic
tort relief.
Part III will evaluate the implications of the
Agriculture Street Landfill litigation for post-Katrina toxic tort
debris and other hazardous substances. Part III first shows how
New Orleans, a predominately African American city, acted as an
historical agent of environmental racism by entering into an
agreement with federal officials and other local entities that
created an environmental justice issue for local residents by
approving the construction of a predominantly African American
community on top of a toxic landfill.
Part III follows the
Agriculture Street Landfill class action lawsuit seeking
environmental justice from New Orleans, while New Orleans
seeks to make third-party defendants liable in the Johnson v.
Orleans Parish litigation. Part III then argues that New Orleans
and the city's housing authority may be liable for negligent
development of the Agriculture Street Landfill Community, even if
they are independent contractors.
Finally, Part III explores
United States v. City of New Orleans, which held that the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers is potentially liable in the Agricultural
Street Landfill litigation because Congress expressly created a
waiver of the Corps governmental immunity from liability under
CERCLA. Part IV contends that creating governmental liability is
a useful toxic tort tool for those who seek post-Katrina
environmental justice.
I.

THE EXTENT OF THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
AVAILABLE IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), also known as the
Superfund,8 is not a universal tool for filing a toxic tort claim.9
ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 223, 227 (1996).
7. See id. at 228 (explaining that state differences in the management of
toxic torts litigation contribute to the difficulty in creating a uniform remedy).
8. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986). The Court in Exxon

noted:
CERCLA imposes an excise tax on petroleum and other specified
chemicals. The Act establishes a trust fund, commonly known as
"Superfund," 87.5% of which is financed through the excise tax, and the
remainder through general revenues. Superfund money may be used to
clean up releases of hazardous substances and for certain other
purposes.
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Congress did not intend for CERCLA to offer payment to a private
person for damages caused by contamination."0 Instead, Congress
passed CERCLA to assist in the speedy cleanup of environmental
contamination produced by discharges from hazardous waste."
The two-fold objectives of CERCLA are: first, to cleanup hazardous
waste locations, and second, to command those responsible for the
contamination to pay for the cost of the cleanup.'2 By denying
traditional personal injury and property damages to private
plaintiffs as a federal claim in toxic tort cases under CERCLA,
Congress substantially departed from the compensatory damage
remedy available under general torts principles in standard state
law tort claims. For example, Ohio defines compensatory damages
as the amount of actual loss experienced by the wronged party,
and therefore actual damages and compensatory damage are one
and the same. 3 The traditional purpose of such compensatory
damages is to make the injured party whole for the harm he or she
has suffered. 4 Compensatory or actual damages may be more
specifically categorized as consequential damages, which are
designed to put the wronged party where he was before the
injury."
Compensatory
damages
include
"general"
and
"consequential," or "special" damages. 6 General damages pay the
costs to a wronged party for the immediate injury or loss suffered,
while "consequential damages are damages that flow from the
consequences of the direct injury." 7
In order to claim
consequential damages, a party must prove that the losses were
reasonably foreseeable before the tortious event occurred. 8
As a concession for deleting personal injury compensation
claim rights from CERCLA, Congress established a study group to
suggest changes in the law to decrease the problems that people
personally injured by hazardous wastes confront while attempting
to recover adequate compensation for the wrong they have
suffered. 9 The study group concluded that several impediments
Id. CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-9675 (2000). Administrative
regulations are located at 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.1105 (2006).
9. Young v. United States, 394 F.3d 858, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Kovach v. Lazzano, No. 1082, 1983 WL 6080, at *3 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.,

Aug. 5, 1983).
14. Id.
15. Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, 567 Pa. 386, 408 n.1 (Pa. 2001)
(Nigro, J., concurring) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Rory A. Valas, Comment, Toxic Palsgraf Proving Causation When The
Link Between Conduct And Injury Appears Highly Extraordinary, 18 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 773, 776 (1991).
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block a toxic tort plaintiffs right to compensatory damages.'
According to the study, high causation benchmarks, demanding
and ambiguous burdens of proof, scientific doubt, preventive
statutes of limitations, elusive or bankrupt defendants, lack of
insurance coverage, and the very expensive cost of litigation all
come together to hinder toxic tort plaintiffs from receiving
adequate payment for a loss. A majority of states have taken a
position very similar to the federal government by refusing to
approve and implement hazardous waste personal injury
compensation laws.2 Since nearly all the states decline to create
statutory claims for toxic tort victims, the lion's share of hazardous
waste victims must seek damages exclusively on the basis of
common law torts.n

II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE UNDERTONE OF
KATRINA FOR THOSE SEEKING Toxic TORTS RELIEF
The concept of equality is embedded in the doctrine of
environmental justice. In New Orleans, the victims of Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath who suffered disproportionately from
the impact of the resulting environmental disaster were
communities of color.n That story continues to develop. Since
Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans during the late summer of
2005, one environmental justice issue that should be revisited is
that of toxic torts. As one commentator maintains, the principles
26
Enof environmental justice possess universal appeal.
people,
all
that
position
the
endorses
vironmental justice
regardless of race, social, or economic status are entitled to equal
protection of environmental health, safety, as well as the
preservation of the ecological system. 7 A person is entitled to file
a toxic tort lawsuit seeking environmental justice only after some
Plaintiffs involved in
type of injury has taken place.2
who have suffered
litigation
injury
personal
environmental justice
of a potential
fear
following:
the
of
or
all
one,
harm may allege
20. Id.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 778.
23. Id.
24. Dean Hill Rivkin, Environmental Justice: A Universal Discourse, 24
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 249, 249 (2005).

25. Id.
26. See id. ("[Plerhaps the biggest challenge facing environmental justice
theorists and practitioners is to translate the principles of environmental

justice to China, an economic behemoth just beginning to reckon with the

staggering environmental impacts of its meteoric rise on the world scene.").

27. Melissa Toffolon-Weiss & J. Timmons Roberts, Toxic Torts, Public
Interest Law, and Environmental Justice: Evidence from Louisiana, 26 LAW &
POLY 259, 260 (2004).

28. Id. at 260-61.
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personal injury because of the concealed impact of pollution;
diminished property value; reduced life style choices (e.g.,
nuisance, pain and suffering, or economic distress); that an attack
of property rights occurred; or monetary damages under tort law
rendered to punish the violator.'
An environmental justice plaintiff must overcome many
obstacles to be successful under the toxic tort litigation model.
Some commentators, though, assert that the impact of a successful
toxic tort lawsuit often has little effect in advancing the
environmental justice rights of other groups suffering from similar
hardships." However, others assert that the law of torts is a very
useful method for plaintiffs to seek payment for harms suffered as
a result of toxic torts. American tort law provides a procedure that
plaintiffs affected by environmental hazards may utilize to seek
redress and compensation. Class action toxic tort lawsuits serve
as a possible effective tool to deter environmental hazards because
juries are able to return large monetary judgments hostile to
corporate dumpers and polluters.3 Toxic tort litigation is a
prospective weapon helpful to poor and minority citizens, the
group most repeteadly and most adversely impacted by toxic
pollutants.32 This adverse impact is exemplified in the pictures of
economically disadvantaged Hurricane Katrina survivors trying to
stay alive during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina's massive
destruction in August of 2005. These vivid images made a
disheartening, but true statement about the status of race, class,
and human rights in America.'
As the world viewed the ugly
picture of Katrina's destruction, it should have realized that a
"social safety net protecting people from abject poverty in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama was not there before this
tragedy and has not emerged in its wake."' Worse, the methods
utilized by the tort reform movement will make it increasingly
more difficult for poor and working class Americans to pursue
toxic tort relief through litigation.'
29. Id. at 261.
30. Id.
31. Steve Kroll-Smith & Saundra D. Westervelt, People, Bodies and
Biospheres:Nexus and the Toxic Tort, 26 LAW & POLY 177, 182 (2004).

32. Id.
33. See Catherine Albisa & Sharda Sekaran, Realizing Domestic Social
Justice Through International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 351, 352 (2006) ("As the rest of the world saw this footage, a
provocative secret was revealed: the income inequities and scarcity of
resources experienced by poor countries are prevalent here, in the world's

richest and most powerful nation, branded as the champion of freedom.").
34. Id.
35. Kroll-Smith & Westervelt, supra note 31, at 183. "Given the incredible
cost associated with the development and pursuit of a viable toxic tort case

and the fact that plaintiffs are most likely to be poor, plaintiffs' attorneys must
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Although the techniques employed by the tort reform
movement have had some success in restricting the effective
utilization of toxic tort litigation to pay victims and discourage
polluters, 36 capping punitive damage awards serves as a
devastating tool of tort reform that undermines the role of
environmental justice in America."
Notwithstanding the
considerable challenges created by the tort reform movement,
some observers still take the position that the private plaintiff
toxic torts lawsuit is increasingly becoming a vital legal tool in the
fight for environmental justice in the face of the political
manipulation of regulatory law involving environmental hazards. 8
Lawyers utilizing the toxic tort litigation route to achieve
environmental justice must also overcome the potential misuse of
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc., an opinion by justices lacking experience
and training in handling either scientific doubt or ambiguity. 9
The Daubert decision requires federal judges to only admit expert
evidence that is "scientifically reliable and relevant."'
One
commentator, Ronald Melnick, warns that a judge who lacks
experience in addressing the uncertainties surrounding scientific
data could reach an erroneous judgment on the reliability and
relevance of evidence connecting environmental factors to illness
suffered by people seeking environmental justice." An erroneous
decision by a judge may well result in an unreasonable exclusion
of bona fide and appropriate scientific evidence that is
indispensable to a plaintiffs toxic tort lawsuit.'
Specifically,
Melnick states that a defendant's Daubert motion to exclude
evidence might be granted in toxic torts litigation because
scientific information about environmental diseases is frequently
incomplete.'
Melnick argues that incomplete scientific evidence
should not result in the exclusion of a plaintiffs evidence in a toxic
tort lawsuit because it is not unusual for scientists to reach
different conclusions about the same dataset addressing the issue
of causation of diseases in people.'
A Daubert motion that
dismisses a plaintiffs evidence creates an unreasonable

have confidence in the potential for a significant damage award in order to
anticipate covering their expenses." Id.
36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Ronald L. Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude
Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH

30, 30
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

(2005).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
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impairment for the toxic tort litigant seeking environmental
justice and a jury that might grant justice if it had access to all of
the relevant and reliable scientific evidence.45
The Daubert
decision has indeed created a number of obstacles for toxic tort
plaintiffs making an effort to get their cases before a jury of their
peers throughout America." Yet, the future of toxic tort litigation
will rely on scientific development and the evaluation of scientific
data by courts in their gate-keeping role. 7
The effort to acquire reliable scientific evidence about the
toxic levels of contamination caused by Hurricane Katrina has
proven controversial. According to Envirtonmental Protection
Agency Administrator, Stephen L. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina is
the biggest disaster the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has ever come across." On September 14, 2005, Johnson informed
reporters "that the Gulf Coast was still facing an array of serious
health threats, including lack of clean drinking water,
astronomically high bacteria counts and unsafe levels of several
toxic metals in floodwaters."49 Johnson also said it was impossible
to provide an assessment of how much time it would take to clean
up the Gulf Coast because the extent of the problem could not be
determined."
Although there were early indications that
widespread hazardous waste existed in New Orleans, the EPA
said that, up to that point, it had uncovered hazardous levels of
only three chemicals in the floodwaters." However, environmental
researchers questioned the reliability of the EPA's testing, because
it did not detect benzene or other petroleum products
45. Id. at 31-32.
46. See Richard W. Clapp & David Ozonoff, Environment and Health: Vital
Intersection or Contested Territory?, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 189, 190 (2004)
(affirming that the Daubert decision "has led to some major obstacles for
plaintiffs attempting to get their cases before juries in many parts of the
United States").
47. See id. (maintaining that "the future of toxic tort litigation will rest, in
part, on how the courts understand the scientific process and the evaluation of
scientific literature, and how they interpret their 'gate-keeping' role").
48. Marla Cone, Katrina's Aftermath: Toxic Threat Still Vague but
Ominous, EPA Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at 20.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. Specifically, reports indicated the following:
Hexavalent chromium and arsenic, which are known human
carcinogens, were reported Wednesday in floodwaters in some New
Orleans neighborhoods at levels that are unsafe for drinking water. The
latest available samples were taken Sept. 4 through Sept. 6. The
chromium compound is used in metal plating. Arsenic, found naturally
in the Earth's crust, occurs in pesticides and wood preservatives. Since
Sept. 3, the agency has reported unsafe lead levels in floodwaters,
including one sample that exceeded the drinking-water standard 15-fold.
Lead can damage the brain of a fetus or child if it is ingested.
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notwithstanding the fact that "oily sheens [were] observable on the
floodwaters." Not surprisingly, experts questioned whether
Johnson's reliance on the EPA tests was justified because there
was reasonable doubt about whether the test could adequately
assess the hazards present in the area."
Environmental activists point the finger at federal and
Louisiana environmental administrators for misleading the
community regarding health risks linked with sediment in the
New Orleans vicinity as a result of Hurricane Katrina.'
The
Natural Resources Defense Council joined other groups in asking
both federal and state environmental officials "to clean up or
remove contaminated topsoil, fully inform the public of potential
risks, and provide returning residents with clear guidelines on
protecting themselves."'
A Louisiana environmental chemist
conducted tests on samples from locations in the New Orleans
area." The tests discovered that arsenic levels throughout New
Orleans were in violation of the EPA's safety limits, in some
neighborhoods by a factor of thirty. 56 "Samples in some residential
neighborhoods near two toxic waste sites found high levels of the
DDT and other banned pesticides and cancer-causing petroleum
chemicals. Some samples also had high levels of lead."" The
environmentalists accused the EPA of not being honest about the
risks to people returning to the city. Environmentalists also
claimed that federal and state environmental protection officials
failed to retest 144 sites around New Orleans with a prior history
of contamination.58
52. Id. Marla Cone reported:
John Froines, director of UCLA's

Center for Occupational

and

Environmental Health, said just comparing the chemicals to drinkingwater standards may not be enough to protect public health. Some, such
as toxic ingredients in petroleum products and pesticides, can be

absorbed through the skin and others can cause allergic reactions.
"There must be over 100,000 volunteers and National Guardsmen and
other officials there," Froines said. "These people are likely to be wading
in water, and they may have some of the most significant exposures. We
know you can get massive uptake [of some chemicals] through the skin
in certain occupational settings. I don't have a sense that anybody is

thinking about that," Froines said.
Id.
53. Bruce Geiselman, Officials Downplayed Risks After Storms, Groups
Charge, WASTE NEWS, Dec. 5, 2005, at 21. Activist groups "called upon the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Louisiana Department of

Environmental Quality to clean up or remove contaminated topsoil, fully
inform the public of potential risks, and provide returning residents with clear
guidelines on protecting themselves."
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. It was further noted that:
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If one were to accept the finding of the Louisiana chemist that
residents of New Orleans were exposed to harmful toxic torts
because of a negligent failure to remove hazardous waste in a
timely manner in the aftermath of Katrina, do those exposed have
Conceivably the most complicated
a mass toxic tort claim?
problem involving mass torts is the status of future claimants. 9
"'Futures' are those who do not now have claims, because injury
has not been sufficiently manifested, but who may well have
claims in the future."0 Toxic tort injuries develop over a period of
time impacting some victims with serious effects, while others
suffer only moderate effects, and some experience little or no
discernible effects. 61 Toxic torts injuries which do readily manifest
themselves, like asbestos-related injuries, often present difficult
evidentiary and administrative problems.62 "Toxic torts by
definition involve a biological interaction between the allegedly
injurious substance and the victim."' Biological interactions as a
whole are very complex, especially when exposures are relatively
small or intermittent.' The manifestation of a toxic tort injury
may sometimes be weeks, months, or even years from the time of
exposure, as in a case involving asbestos.6" After one has identified
an appropriate defendant against whom to file a mass toxic tort
lawsuit, only those mass torts "arising from a common cause or
disaster" are suitable for class action certification in
Louisiana.' Toxic tort plaintiffs who suffer harm as a result of

"Residents face a health risk because they can easily inhale
contaminated sediment or get it on their skin when they are trying to
clean it up," said Dr. Gina Solomon, a physician who led the NRDC
research team. If the contamination is not cleaned up, residents could
face serious health risks from long-term exposure, including cancer,
neurological diseases, and hormonal and reproductive system problems,
she said.

Id.
59. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Mass Torts: The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1901, 1901 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1902.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1902-03.
66. Boyd v. Allied Signal, Inc., 898 So. 2d 450, 457 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2004)
(citing Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997)). As the
court noted:
The class action is a nontraditional litigation procedure permitting a
representative with typical claims to sue or defend on behalf of, and
stand in judgment for, a class of similarly situated persons when the
question is one of common or general interest to persons so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court.
Id. at 456 (quoting Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La.
1997)).
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Katrina will be confronted with the ugly legal reality of proving
the biological interaction between the purportedly damaging toxic
substances is challenging.67 Potential mass toxic torts plaintiffs
face stiff proof challenges in the Katrina situation because many
injuries will be a matter of gradation and the proof of causation
will be "based on probabilistic analysis" that will be subject to an
intense challenge by defendant(s).'
In spite of the major hurdles faced by those seeking to use
toxic tort litigation to ensure fair and equal treatment for
individuals exposed to harmful levels of toxicity, Katrina plaintiffs
Katrina plaintiffs
should not automatically avoid litigation.
should continue litigating to protect their interest in living in a
safe and healthy environment because their only viable option
may be to seek either personal damages for toxic tort exposure or
environmental cleanup from the appropriate party. Because of a
fear that Katrina's floodwater made New Orleans a virtual toxic
dump, EPA officials obtained samples from all around the city of
biological pathogens and over 100 chemical pollutants, including
pesticides, metals and industrial chemicals.'
Five "Superfund sites" in the New Orleans area, including
several of America's worst toxic messes, were flooded by Hurrican
Katrina. ° In the flooded regions of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, thirty-one Superfund sites exist." In the areas that
have flooded, five oil spills had previously occurred.72 Additionally,
hazardous waste railcars may have been flooded, but "federal rail
officials say they've had no reports of leakage so far."73 Tests
further revealed elevated levels of E. coli and other harmful
coliform bacteria in the floodwater. 4 It was further shown that
New Orleans floodwaters also contained high levels of E. coli
exceeding the EPA's safe swimming limit by 109 times. Chemical
samples taken on September 4 and 6, 2005, by the EPA and the
Louisiana Department of Environment Quality further support a
toxic
Orleans
as a virtual
of New
characterization

67. See Hazard, supra note 59, at 1903 (attesting to the difficulties toxic
tort plaintiffs will encounter once they file a lawsuit).
68. See id. (indicating that "proof of causation often is not very definite" and
therefore plaintiffs will face difficult causation issues).
69. John Heilprin, Bacteria, Lead Biggest Contaminants of New Orleans
Floodwater, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sep. 14, 2005, available at http://jeffords.
senate.gov/ap091505.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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dump."6
These tests consistently revealed high levels of the
chemicals
hexavalent
chromium,
arsenic,
and
lead.77
Nevertheless, the nature of the toxic torts issue for individuals
seeking environmental justice in the Katrina aftermath will be a
massive undertaking. The enormous amount of damage and toxic
exposure generated by Katrina will not be solved by litigation
initiated by concerned citizens seeking a clean and safe place to
live in the aftermath of Katrina. In spite of the very toxic nature
of the environmental harm done in the New Orleans area and the
large scale damages to homes and businesses, an individual or
group of individuals must remember that the right to litigate
might be a tedious and expensive method to collect damages
and/or help establish environmental policy.
No less than 140,000 southern Louisiana homes and
businesses were made uninhabitable as a result of the floods and
winds produced by Hurricane Katrina.'8 These damaged structures
represent the majority of the twenty-two million tons of debris left
behind by the storm." The total number of structures that may be
condemned and bulldozed may come to 160,000 according to Mike
McDaniel, chief of the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality.'
The numbers presented by McDaniel come from the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality's first general
evaluation of damage to the communities impacted by the storm.81
Katrina destroyed 350,000 cars and other vehicles.82 Several of
these vehicles were under water in New Orleans and St. Bernard
Parishes for a number of weeks, and will join one million stoves,
refrigerators, and additional appliances that will be disposed of.'
McDaniel identified additional environmental issues confronting
South Louisiana: "176 low-level radiation leaks, tens of millions of
gallons of hazardous materials, such as cleansers and bleach,
polluted floodwater that was pumped into Lake Ponchartrain, raw
sewage that is still pumping into the Mississippi River."'
Because southern Louisiana has millions of tons of debris of
which to dispose, the likelihood is great that residents of Louisiana
will be exposed to a toxic harm by methods used to dispose of the

toxic waste created by Katrina-related flood and wind damage.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Doug Simpson, Katrina Destroyed At Least 140,000 La. Homes,
Businesses,ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 29, 2005.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Some commentators maintain that "[w]inning an environmental
struggle is not as simple as securing a lawyer and launching a
lawsuit."85 The plaintiffs, as victims of toxic tort harms related to
Katrina, should present an effective message that appeals to the
contemporary cultural scene in a manner that attracts good press
for their cause as well as outside support and resources.' In toxic
tort litigation, the lawyer and Katrina plaintiffs pursuing the
environmental justice aim of proper disposal of debris will also
have a duty to study the political landscape and to identify both
friends and foes in developing a successful strategy to achieve
their goal. 7
A very limited number of private tort actions exist that
residents can pursue against either a governmental or private
defendant for conduct relating to toxic tort damage caused by
Hurricane Katrina. But, those limited rights should be exercised
to force toxic torts defendants to do what the law requires in
assisting with the proper cleanup and disposal of disasterLocal, state, and federal responders must
generated waste.
address unique cleanup questions due to the enormity and amount
of environmental harm caused by Katrina on the impacted
communities.M Katrina created an urgent call to clear debris and
control discharges of hazardous substances that endangered
health and safety or delayed emergency response operations. 89
Next, authorities were called on to "determine how and where
the huge quantities of Hurricane Katrina-related waste and debris
(hazardous and nonhazardous), would be gathered, separated, and
ultimately disposed."' As one student correctly identified, "[gliven
85. Toffolon-Weiss & Roberts, supra note 27, at 268.
86. See id. (providing an explanation of how lawyers and protest groups
should approach the environmental justice struggle).
87. Id.
88. ROBERT ESWORTHY, ET AL., CLEANUP AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA:
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2006),

available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/06may/RL33115.pdf (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006).

89. Id.
90. Id. As reported further in the CRS Report for Congress:
The 109th Congress has been working to address the devastation
wrought by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf States, which is on a scale
larger than any experienced by the United States in a single natural

disaster incident. In addition to supplemental funding, a number of
legislative proposals regarding procedures and requirements for the
response and recovery from "super catastrophes" are being debated and
considered. This report aims to provide an overview of environmental

considerations raised by the immediate and intermediate cleanup tasks
across the diverse communities in the affected region, and of federal
legal authorities and plans for tackling those tasks. The report also

discusses coordinated roles and activities among local, state, and federal
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the potentially hazardous nature of disaster debris at
extraordinary quantities, disposal methods raise concerns about
potential future liability, should hazardous substances be released
into the environment."9 The question presented of course is: who
is responsible for paying for the cleanup of the debris?9 Courts
typically "h[o]ld municipalities liable as potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) for releases of hazardous substances at sites where
municipalities owned the site, disposed of, or arranged for the
disposal of, municipal solid waste (MSW), which is known to
contain some hazardous substances."93 In the post-Katrina era,
the wisdom of making municipalities liable for the extraordinary
challenge of disaster debris cleanup generated by Katrina may be
questioned.' A lack of preparedness with regard to disaster debris
management is responsible for clean-up delays and environmental
issues related to Katrina. 9' The United States Army Corps of
Engineers (the Corps), the lead agency for removal of Katrina's
debris, and the City of New Orleans might be liable under
CERCLA for the discharge of hazardous substances at sites
utilized to dispose of the hurricane's debris."

agencies and officials. Finally, the report serves to reference other,
more detailed CRS reports and other sources on particular Katrina
cleanup activities. Public health and environmental concerns associated
with Hurricane Katrina span a wide variety of issues, including air and
water quality and hazardous chemical releases. Katrina's impacts also
have environmental implications for other major issue areas, such as
energy, transportation, and defense.
While this report addresses
selected cleanup concerns receiving post-Katrina attention, it is not
intended to provide comprehensive coverage of all public health and
environmental issues associated with Hurricane Katrina, nor is it
within the scope of this report to analyze ongoing legislative and
appropriations considerations related to the hurricane disaster response
efforts. Id.
91. Kathryn A. Wasik, Comment, Municipal Liability For DisasterDebris
Disposal, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 340 (2006).
92. See id. ("The question is who will have to pay for future cleanup?").
93. Id.
94. See id. (citing Diana Ng, Note, Debating the Wisdom of Placing
Superfund Costs on Municipalities, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2193, 2199-2204 (1996)
(discussing the arguments against and in favor of limiting CERCLA liability
for municipalities)).
95. Id. at 354.
96. Id. The City of New Orleans is still awaiting CERCLA action by the
federal government addressing the discharge of hazardous substances from a
landfill used to dispose of debris from Hurricane Betsy. See United States v.
City of New Orleans, No. 02-3618, 2003 WL 22208578 (E.D. La. Sept. 19,
2003).
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III. THE IMPLICATION OF THE AGRICULTURE STREET
LANDFILL LITIGATION FOR POST KATRINA TOXIC TORTS
DEBRIS AND OTHER HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
A. ProtagonistNews Orleans Createsan EnvironmentalRacism
Issue by Approving the Buildingof a PredominantlyAfrican
American Community on the Toxic Agriculture Landfill Site
The Agriculture Street Landfill environmental justice legend
was launched around 1910, after the City of New Orleans used the
site as a municipal waste dump.97 The site continuously received
solid waste for fifty years after this period.'
The waste was
burned on site and buried in the adjacent community. During the
1940s and 1950s, residents in the immediate vicinity of the site
voiced that they objected to the "terrible" stench produced by the
Agricultural Street Landfill. 9 When the landfill was shut down, it
was seventeen feet deep and spanned ninety-five acres." The
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) and the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) selected
the Agriculture Street Landfill site to build 167 new units of public
housing for low income residents.'
In 1975, the neighborhood
that housed the site, Press Park, grew after the Desire Community
Housing Corporation (DCHC) constructed sixty-seven singlefamily homes and an elderly-care facility."
The DCHC named
these additional properties "Gordon Plaza," and in 1981, HUD
granted the project seven million federal dollars."
After the
residents of Press Park and Gordon Plaza moved into their homes,
they immediately became aware of landfill debris in their yards.
This was a reliable warning of the environmental justice problems
associated with building homes on the Agriculture Street
Landfill." After the residents of the Agriculture Street Landfill
community realized that the land both under and bordering their
homes was full of dangerous contaminants, residents met with city
officials and the representatives of other parties. On May 23,
1985, they proposed to relocate their community.'
The residents
of Agriculture Street soon concluded that both federal and local
politicians simply gave "lip service" to their attempt to relocate."
The Agriculture Street Landfill residents tried a number of legal
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Toffolon-Weiss & Roberts, supra note 27, at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271-272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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strategies to stop the EPA from performing an inadequate
cleanup. ' °7 Their efforts to stop the EPA from performing a less
The EPA concluded
than adequate cleanup were not successful.'
that the Agriculture Street Landfill was not toxic enough to
warrant relocation of the neighborhood consisting mainly of
African-American residents.'
Environmental officials have performed many rounds of soil
tests at a site near the Agriculture Street Landfill in New Orleans
since Hurricane Katrina and implied in April, 2006, for the first
time "that some areas of the city could be slated for remediation of
lead contamination.""0 In April of 2006, Don Williams, of the EPA,
alleged that while that test site is in close proximity to the
Agriculture Street Landfill Superfund site, the tests suggest the
landfill is not responsible for the lead contamination."' As of April
2006, several months after Katrina, Sam Coleman, response
director for the EPA, said the EPA wanted to review more
information before making a decision about whether to remediate
specific sites in New Orleans." 2 Coleman articulated the position
that tests for other contaminants as well as the amount of arsenic
in the soil failed to reveal any cause for long-term concern."'
Monique Harden, co-director of Advocates for Environmental
Human Rights, a nonprofit, public interest law firm located in
New Orleans, is very skeptical of the EPA's finding on the toxic
impact of substances released by Hurricane Katrina in Cancer
Alley, the area between New Orleans and Baton Rouge."' The
Advocates for Environmental Human Rights continues to work
with others to obtain samples of the sediments left behind after
107. Id. at 273.
108. Id.
109. Id. Specifically, as Toffolon-Weiss and Roberts note:
The EPA did not believe that Agriculture Street was dangerous enough
to warrant relocation .... Instead it opted to remove two feet of
contaminated soil from residents' yards, replacing it with a "geotextile"
(a fine porous plastic mesh) barrier and two feet of clean soil, at a cost of
approximately $20 million. With the one-two-foot barrier created by the
EPA cleanup plan, all trees in the neighborhood were removed and
residents are instructed on which trees they can plant. The plans also
restrict residents from making additions to their homes and from
building in-ground swimming pools. Despite residents' protests and
opposition from the City of New Orleans, the EPA began cleanup of the
site in late 1998, starting with the undeveloped portion of the land
surrounding the site and the Gordon Plaza Elderly Apartments ....
Id. (citation omitted).
110. Amy Wold, EPA Looks at N.O. Soil's Lead Content Pre-KatrinaProblem
May Need Remediation, BATON ROUGE ADvOc., Apr. 6, 2006, at B1.
111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Ben Greenberg, Katrina Hits Cancer Alley, DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar. 1,
2006, at 34.
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the draining of Katrina's floodwaters." 5 "We didn't want a replay
of what EPA did in New York after 9/11 - claiming that air
quality was good when in fact it was very unhealthy."" 6 Wilma
Subra, a chemist in Louisiana, took and evaluated sediment
samples." 7 Her sampling analysis and the EPA's tests revealed
elevated levels of toxic contamination in the sediment deposits
covering yards, streets, and sidewalks in flooded neighborhoods." 8
Although arsenic and diesel fuel substances were the prevailing
contaminants found, the "EPA concluded that ... more retesting
and analysis was needed. [Advocates for Environmental Human
Rights] saw it very differently," said Harden, "and have been
demanding that the agency take action to immediately clean up
the sediment.""9
In the post-Katrina era, it appears that Harden and other
environmental activists are now demanding that the EPA clean up
New Orleans toxic sites in good faith to protect environmental
health."' In the aftermath of Katrina, Harden spoke about some
of the specific environmental issues facing the Agriculture Street
community, a community of individuals whose homes were built
on top of a toxic landfill."' The Agriculture Street subdivision was
built in the 1960s and 1970s and was marketed to African
Americans. 2 ' People who moved into this subdivision did not
know their homes were built on top of a toxic landfill." After
Agriculture Street community residents realized they were
suffering serious health problems, including cancer, they became
aware their homes were built on a toxic landfill."" A study by the
state of Louisiana confirmed that Agriculture Street residents
possess the highest frequency of breast cancer in the state among
women and men."' In 1994, the Agriculture Street community
was selected as a Superfund site."6 "EPA provided a ridiculous
cleanup that involved removing one to two feet of contaminated
soil from yards that have 17 feet of soil contaminated with over
150 toxic chemicals and heavy metals. And EPA refused to

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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temporarily relocate residents who were exposed to toxins during
over a year of excavation."127
B. AgricultureStreet Landfill Residents Class Action Seeks
EnvironmentalJustice from New Orleans while New Orleans
Seeks to Make Third-party Defendants Liable: Johnson v. Orleans
Parish School Board
The residents of the Agriculture Street landfill filed a class
action law suit more than five years ago in an attempt to seek
2
environmental justice from toxic exposure."
The named plaintiffs
in the Johnson v. Orleans ParishSchool Board class action lawsuit
were either current or former residents of the Agricultural Street
Landfill community who purportedly suffered injury. 9 The site
contains nearly 190 acres bordered on the north side by Higgins
Boulevard, on the east side by Louisa Street, on the south side by
Florida Avenue and on the west side by Almonaster Avenue and
Peoples Avenue Canal.'
The Agriculture Street site contains the
"Press Park" community, the "Gordon Plaza" development, the
"Gordon Plaza Senior Citizens Apartment Complex" and Moton
Elementary School.'
The plaintiffs in the Johnson class are all
people who sustained damages through exposure to hazardous and
toxic substances in the soil at Agriculture Street Landfill where
they lived, worked, and played since the 1970s.'32 Nine of the class
representatives testified at trial."= The plaintiffs' claims relate to
both present and future illnesses and diseases that may develop
because of their exposure to contaminated soil. Further, the
plaintiffs were asking for medical monitoring damages as well
monetary damages for the diminution of property values caused by
the contaminated toxic soil.'
On the other side, the named
defendants in Johnson included the City of New Orleans (City),
the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), the Orleans
Parish School Board (School Board), and their insurers: National
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.
Fire Insurance Company, Republic Insurance Company, and

127. Id. "Residents have had to sue federal and state housing agencies and
other responsible government agencies for building their subdivision on top a
toxic landfill. A few weeks ago, residents won their lawsuit in a state court,
but the government defendants are expected to appeal." Id.
128. Johnson v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 790 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2001).
129. Id. at 738.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.

134. Id.
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Insurance
South American
Insurance Company/Louisiana
Guaranty Association.'
In the early 1900s, New Orleans operated the site as a
landfill, collecting and transporting waste mounds, waste pits,
waste lagoons, and surface deposits, much of which are alleged to
In the 1960s and 1970s, while
be toxic and/or hazardous.
developing the Agriculture Street landfill site into a residential
community, New Orleans and HANO gave contracts for the
construction of three residential developments on top of the
landfill to different entities, entities that were not parties to the
In 1986, the EPA started
Johnson class action suit. 36
investigating the Agriculture Street Landfill site, which resulted
in the site being placed on the National Priorities List in 1994 as a
"Superfund" site.3 7
In Johnson, the class action plaintiffs maintained that the
contractors hired by both New Orleans and HANO either failed to
take proper corrective measures, or negligently performed their
respective duties." The plaintiffs also alleged that New Orleans
and HANO breached their duties to ensure that the contractors
they hired performed in a proper manner, and it was because of
The
this alleged breach that the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit. 9
plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to medical monitoring and
Additionally, the
remuneration for their economic losses.140
lawsuit
was
not
to
be considered as
plaintiffs stipulated that their
4
'
injury.
personal
for
a claim
In the 2004 version of the consolidated Johnson v. Orleans
Parish School Board4 1 ("Johnson II") decision, defendants/third135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id.
Id.

141. Id.

The trial court defined the following claims the plaintiffs could

pursue:
[1] Current and former residents who have lived on the site of the
former landfill site, as described above, for at least twelve months prior
to February 1, 1994; [2] Current and former business owners and their
employees who have operated a business on the former landfill site, as
described above, for at least twelve months prior to February 1, 1994; [31
Current residents who are the owners of record of their homes, or who
are buying their homes but have not yet completed their payments; and
[4] Former students and employees of Morton Elementary School who

attended or worked at the school on the site of the former landfill fore at
least twelve months or one full school year prior to February 1, 1994.
The trial court held that the named plaintiffs met all of the statutory
requirements for class certification.

Id.
142. Johnson v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. (Johnson II), 890 So. 2d. 579 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 2004).
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party plaintiffs, the School Board, the city, and HANO
unsuccessfully appealed a trial court decision giving the no cause
of action and no right of action exceptions to the third-party
defendants BFI Waste Systems of North America, Inc., the New
Orleans Public Belt Railroad Commission, CFI Industries, Inc.,
IPC, Inc., and the Port of New Orleans."
The original plaintiffs filed suit against New Orleans, HANO
and the School Board alleging damages as a consequence of the
construction of a predominantly African-American community on
top of the Agriculture Street Landfill.' In their suit, the original
plaintiffs allege that the defendants developed residential and
commercial properties on this site in the 1960s and 1970s, and
breached their duty to require those it hired to assist in developing
the landfill property. They breached their duty by failing to either
remove the hazardous substances from the site, or to warn the
plaintiffs of the existence of such substances.'" The defendants
identified in this litigation filed third-party demands for direct
damages, indemnity, and contribution against the appellees, BFI
Waste Systems of North America, Inc., the New Orleans Public
Belt Railroad Commission, CFI Industries, Inc., IPC, Inc., and the
Port of New Orleans.'
The third-party demands assert that the
third-party defendants are the corporate successors to companies
that inappropriately hauled and disposed of hazardous items at
the landfill site before 1958, when the landfill closed.'47 The thirdparty defendants answered the third-party demands by filing
exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action."
On
143. The court held:
After reviewing the third party demands in this case, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in granting the exceptions of no cause of action
because the third party demands do not allege facts sufficient to identify
a legal duty owed by the third party defendants to the plaintiffs or the
third party plaintiffs. According to the facts alleged in the third party
demands, the waste disposal or salvaging companies later acquired by
third party defendants either caused or contributed to the
contamination of the Agriculture Street Landfill with hazardous
substances. There are no allegations that the third party defendants
knew or should have known that an area designated as a landfill and
used by them as such would years later become the site of a residential
neighborhood and school. Accepting the allegations of fact in the third
party demands as true, the third party plaintiffs have not shown that
the third party defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs, and therefore, third
party plaintiffs have no claim for contribution or indemnity against the
third party defendants. The trial court did not err in granting the third
party defendants' exceptions of no cause of action.

Id. at 582.
144. Id. at 580.
145. Johnson, 790 So. 2d. at 739.

146. Johnson 11, 890 So. 2d. at 580.
147. Id. at 580-81.
148. Id. at 581.
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appeal, the third-party plaintiffs argued that the trial court
committed reversible error by granting the third-party defendants'
exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action."' After
reviewing the third-party demands in this case, a Louisiana
appeals court reasoned that the trial court did not commit error by
granting the exceptions because the third-party demands failed to
allege enough relevant facts to support a recognizable legal duty
owed by the third-party defendants to either the original plaintiffs
or the third-party plaintiffs.' 50
The facts alleged in the third-party demands state that the
waste disposal and salvaging companies later hired by third-party
defendants either caused or contributed to the contamination of
But,
the Agriculture Street Landfill with hazardous materials.'
there are no allegations in the pleadings of the third-party
plaintiffs that the third-party defendants either knew or should
have known that a locale selected for a landfill and used by them
as a landfill would many years afterwards become the site of a
residential neighborhood and school."' Viewing the allegations in
the third-party demands as if they were true, the third-party
plaintiffs still failed to demonstrate that the third-party
defendants owed a duty to the original plaintiffs. As a result, the
third-party plaintiffs did not have a claim for contribution or
The trial court
indemnity against the third-party defendants."
therefore did not make an error when it granted the third-party
The appellate court in Johnson H
defendants' exceptions.TM
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to allow
amendments of the third-party demands within thirty days of this
judgment."'
In the 2005 edition of Johnson v. Orleans Parish School
Board 6 (Johnson III) the defendant-appellant School Board and
the defendant-third-party-plaintiff-appellant HANO appealed a
decision rendered on June 15, 2002, granting the exceptions of no
cause of action and no right of action filed on behalf of third-party
defendants Edward Levy Metals, Inc. (Levy Metals) and Delta ByProducts, 7Inc. (Delta), and dismissing Levy Metals and Delta from
this suit."
The principal plaintiffs had a residential history in the
community at the former Agriculture Street Landfill site."8 The
149. Id.
150. Id. at 582.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 583.

156. 897 So. 2d 812, 814 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005).

157. Id.
158. Id. at 815.
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main demand was based on the assertion that the defendants,
New Orleans, HANO and the School Board, failed to correctly seal
or otherwise eliminate hazardous substances at the site of the
Landfill. The defendants also failed to warn the plaintiffs of these
substances before approving, promoting, and developing
residential and commercial units as well as an elementary school
on top of the landfill. 9 Yet, the Agriculture Street Landfill land
was never owned by the City, HANO, or the School Board during
the period it operated as a landfill." New Orleans had leased the
landfill from the Lemle family."0 ' Moreover, Delta managed a
salvage facility on some of the Landfill property from 1949 until
1958. Nor did Levy Metals ever own any of the Landfill property,
though Edward Levy individually had an ownership interest in the
property.'62 However, the class plaintiffs were not contending that
the Agriculture Street Landfill operated improperly or violated
any standard of care, ordinance, or regulation while it was being
used as a landfill.'63 The class plaintiffs claimed instead that the
City's and HANO's negligence started in the 1960s after the
landfill stopped operating."
In addition, the class plaintiffs
argued that the School Board's negligence did not begin until
1983, fifteen years after the landfill closed.'
The source of the
third-party demand against Levy Metals and Delta was rooted in
the argument that they unacceptably dumped and/or handled
waste at the landfill before the time that the negligence alleged in
the main demand happened."
The legal issues presented in
Johnson III were therefore nearly identical to those
decided in the
67
earlier Johnson II decision, a controlling decision.'
M

159. Id. at 814.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 815. The court in Johnson III quoted the statement of the case in
Johnson II, noting that it was "equally applicable for all material purposes to
the instant appeal":
The original plaintiffs in this case are current and former residents of
three housing developments in New Orleans. These plaintiffs filed suit
against the City, HANO and the School Board alleging damages
resulting from the construction of a community on top of a former

municipal landfill site known as the Agriculture Street Landfill.
According to the suit, in the 1960's and 1970's, these defendants
developed residential and commercial properties and an elementary

school on this site without first removing hazardous substances from the
site and warning plaintiffs of the existence of these substances.
JohnsonIII, 897 So. 2d at 815; Johnson 11, 890 So. 2d. at 580.
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In Johnson III, a Louisiana appellate court accepted the line
of argument made in the HANO brief that the third-party
defendants, including Levy Metals and Delta Products, salvaged
metal and other items from the trash while contracting with New
Orleans between 1949 and 1958 and still have property at the
Agriculture Street Landfill site."
The court held no basis to
distinguish the allegations made against the third-party
defendants in Johnson H from those made against Levy Metals
and Delta in Johnson III. As a result, the Johnson III court
adopted the standard of review utilized to review the exception of
no cause of action first approved by the Johnson H ruling."9 The
Johnson III court cited to Johnson H and "conclude[d] that the
trial court did not err in granting the exceptions of no cause of
action because the third-party demands do not allege facts
sufficient to identify a legal duty owed by the third-party
defendants to the plaintiffs or the third party plaintiffs." 7 ° Very
similar to Johnson II, there was not a single allegation that the
third-party defendants, Levy Metals and Delta, knew or should
have known that a location selected by New Orleans as a landfill
would in the future become the site of a residential community
and school.'71 The court stated in Johnson II, the court "need not
decide whether Levy Metals or Delta is included in the definition
of proprietor under La. C.C. art. 667 since the plaintiffs fail[ed] to
allege that any one of the class members lived in the landfill area
during its operation."'72 Under relevant Louisiana law, third-party
defendants involved in a toxic tort lawsuit for damages because of
exposure to hazardous waste from the Agriculture Street Landfill
site may adopt by reference the line of reasoning advanced by
additional third-party defendants in their prior exceptions filed in
the same lawsuit. 73 Louisiana rules of civil procedure addressing
the form of exceptions do not forbid one from fulfilling the content
requirements for exceptions as a result of incorporation by
reference.'
Consistent with Johnson H, the Johnson III court
affirmed granting the appellees, Levy Metal or Delta, exceptions of
no cause of action and remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to allow amendments to the demands of the thirdparty plaintiffs.'

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Johnson III, 897 So. 2d at 815.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id.

173. Id. at 816.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 817.
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In the 2006 treatment of Johnson v. Orleans Parish School
Board78 (Johnson IV) the School Board made a third-party claim
against CFI Industries, Inc. and IPC, Inc.' CFI and IPC answered
the demands by claiming exceptions of no cause of action and no
right of action.178 The trial court approved the exceptions. The
School Board appealed the holding of the trial court.'79
The Johnson IV plaintiffs were either residents or past
residents of three residential projects in New Orleans."S° The
plaintiffs initially sued the city, the Housing Authority of New
Orleans, and the School Board.'
The plaintiffs alleged they
suffered damages as a consequence of the construction of a
residential community on the Agriculture Street Landfill. 8 ' The
plaintiffs argued that the defendants developed urban residential
and commercial property on the landfill site without initially
removing hazardous substances from the site and failed to warn
the plaintiffs that the substances were present."
The School
Board in Johnson IV filed third-party complaints seeking direct
damages, indemnification, and contribution from the corporate
successors to companies that purportedly disposed of hazardous
materials inappropriately at the landfill site before it closed in
1958.18
These third-party defendants were CFI and IPC, the
successors to Letellier Phillips Paper Company. The trial court
held the defendants were entitled to the exceptions and the School
Board challenged the decision on appeal.'
In Johnson IV, the Louisiana Appeals Court for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the trial court decision providing for an exception
of no cause of action and remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to allow amendment of the third-party complaint so
that it may properly state a cause of action."
Following the
remand, the School Board amended its complaint against CFI and
IPC, who both filed exceptions of no cause of action and no right of
action to the amended third-party complaint. The trial court
granted the post-remand exceptions to CFI and IPC, and the
School Board appealed the trial court's determination.'87
To determine whether a pleading states a cause of action in
Louisiana, a court reviews the pleadings, accepting the properly
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

929 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 762.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762-63.
Id. at 763.
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pleaded facts as if they were true." At the trial of an exception of
no cause of action, the main issue for consideration is "whether, on
the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief
sought." 9 The appropriate question for the no cause of action
exception is "whether, in light of facts viewed most favorably for
the plaintiff and with all doubts resolved in favor of the plaintiff,
the petition states a valid cause of action.""
In Johnson IV, the appellate court held that the trial court
correctly granted CFI and IPC's request for the exception of no
cause of action by finding the petition did not identify that CFI
and IPC owed a legal duty to the School Board. The appellate
court concluded that "[a]ccepting the allegations of fact in the third
party demands as true, the third party plaintiffs have not shown
that the third party defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs, and
therefore, third party plaintiffs have no claim for contribution or
indemnity against the third party defendants." 9'
The
uncorroborated conclusions of the plaintiff, not backed up by facts,
failed to establish a cause of action."9 Accordingly, to defeat an
exception of no cause of action, the factual allegations, if proven,
must at least show that one party owed a legal duty.193 The
amended third-party complaint alleged that CFI and IPC, as the
corporate successors to Letellier Phillips, disposed of items
possessing elevated levels of toxicity at the Agriculture Landfill
site and that they should have known such conduct would harm
both people and the environment.'"
The factual allegations
concerning CFI and IPC, as the corporate successors to Letellier
Phillips, were that Letellier Phillips salvaged some items from the
landfill. As amended, the third-party demand still failed to allege
that a legal duty was owed to the plaintiffs, residents, or former
residents of the Agricultural Street Landfill community. Thus,
CFI and IPC did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs based on the
allegations contained in the amended third-party demand.
According to the third-party plaintiff in Johnson IV, each
third-party defendant owed a duty to the plaintiffs to use the
Agriculture Street Landfill consistently with its designated
purpose and to disclose the name of items disposed of at the
landfill. The allegations connected to CFI's and IPC's predecessor
did not involve the deposit or dumping of material at the landfill.
The particular allegations regarding Letellier Phillips were stated
in the original third-party demand and were incorporated by

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Johnson 11, 890 So. 2d at 582).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764-765.
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reference into the amended third-party demand.
"These
allegations relate to removal of certain materials from the landfill.
There are no allegations in the original third-party demand or the
amended third-party demand that the removal of materials from
the landfill caused damage to anyone. ""' 5 The appellate court
concluded that the defendants' factual allegations in both the
original and the amended third-party demand failed to show the
basis for the School Board's conclusion that CFI and IPC were
legally liable to the plaintiff residents for the conduct of a
corporate predecessor allegedly occurring between 1948 and
1958.196

C. New Orleans and the City's Housing Authority May Be Liable
for Negligent Development of the Agriculture Street Landfill
Community Even if They were Independent Contractors
In the original Johnson case, the plaintiffs' rather fuzzy toxic
tort cause of action against New Orleans, HANO, and the School
Board as defendants made it very difficult for those defendants to
establish a credible third-party demand against purported thirdparty defendants for breach of a legal duty. In order to be
successful, the original plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
negligent breach of a legal duty was the proximate cause of the
harm suffered by the plaintiffs from exposure to materials from
the Agriculture Street Landfill. The Plaintiffs rather nebulously
claimed damages for exposure to hazardous and toxic substances
from the Agriculture Street Landfill community as either current
or former residents, business owners, employees, or students. 97 It
is clear that the plaintiffs had suffered an incredible moral and
reprehensible wrong by being encouraged to live on top of a former
toxic landfill without any, let alone adequate notice of the toxic
nature of the landfill on which their homes sat. Although New
Orleans and HANO began the residential development project on
the site of the toxic Agriculture Street Landfill, it is difficult to
determine whether these well-deserving plaintiffs stated a proper
cause of action against the original defendants in their pleadings.
While developing the toxic Agriculture Street landfill site, New
Orleans and HANO awarded contracts to build three residential
projects to entities who were not parties in the Johnson
litigation.'9 8 As a general rule, a principal is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor while the contractor is
conducting contractual duties.'
Louisiana recognizes two
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Johnson, 790 So. 2d at 738.
198. Id. at 738-39.
199. See Powell v. Fuentes, 786 So. 2d 277, 281 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2001). In
Powell, a patient sued a hospital and emergency room doctor claiming the
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exceptions to this general rule: (1) where the job is "ultra
hazardous," and (2) where the principal keeps the right to
supervise or control the job performance of the independent
contractor. "Whether the principal retained the right to control
the work is of primary concern." It is essential to determine
whether the right to supervise and control the job exists, not
whether that right was exercised."°
The issue of whether a
contractor possesses independent contractor status is a factual
question to be decided on a case-by-case basis.20 '
It is very
plausible that the plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate that, in
the process of developing a residential community on top of the
Agriculture Street Landfill, both HANO and New Orleans
reserved the right to control and supervise the work of its
contractors, which would defeat any claims that the contracts were
independent." If the plaintiffs could show that the city contractors
failed to remove ultra hazardous toxic materials from the
Agriculture Street Landfill while developing the property, they
may have had another basis for challenging any claim by either
New Orleans or HANO that the contractors selected to develop the
landfill were independent under relevant Louisiana law.
As in Johnson, the plaintiffs may argue that the contractors
"failed to take proper corrective measures or negligently performed
tasks. " " The plaintiffs might also argue that New Orleans and
HANO hired contractors who negligently failed to perform their
task of remediating the toxic Agriculture Street Landfill site
before proceeding to develop it for residential use, and further,
that the contractors' negligence is derived from a non-delegable
duty. It does not appear that the plaintiffs were arguing that New
Orleans and HANO were negligent in selecting the contractors for
development of the landfill; however, a little more investigation of
the facts might well reveal that the defendants were negligent in
the selection of the contractor for development of toxic landfill.
Again, like the plaintiffs in Johnson, the plaintiffs in such a
case could argue "it was the duty of the [defendants] to ensure that
the contractors they hired performed these duties thoroughly and
accurately," and that "[ilt is for the alleged breach of this duty that
the plaintiffs filed th[e] lawsuit." 0 ' The plaintiffs' specific legal
issue before the court in Johnson should have been whether New
doctor negligently failed to remove an external object from her foot, and
therefore the hospital should be held liable. The court held there were fact
issues concerning whether the doctor was an independent contractor
preventing the court from granting the hospital's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 279.
200. Id. at 281.
201. Id.
202. Johnson, 790 So. 2d at 739.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Orleans or HANO was liable to residents or former residents
under the non-delegable duty theory for the negligent failure of its
contractors to remediate a toxic landfill before using the land for
residential purposes.205 In analogous circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana stated in Miller v. Martin that the Department
of Social Services may be held vicariously liable for abuse inflicted
by foster parents upon children in the custody of the Department
of Social Services because the Department has a non-delegable
duty of care and protection that child.2" The Louisiana Supreme
Court's opinion suggested that the court was willing to give a
reasonable interpretation of the non-delegable duty in order to
impose a reasonable duty of care on public officials to protect
people from unreasonable harm caused by independent contractors
who do business with a governmental entity.
Such a nondelegable duties imposes upon a principal entity a duty to provide
protection to others or their property. If the principal assigns the
performance of that duty to another person, the principal will still
be subject to liability for the harm caused by the failure of the
other person to perform the assigned duty. °7 In fact, a person who
assigns a specific piece of work to a contractor is also liable for the
failure of the contractors, who is not the principal's servant or
agent, to carry out the terms of the assignment.20 8 "It is difficult to
suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable character of such
duties may be determined, other than the conclusion of the courts
that the responsibility is so important to the community that the
employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another."2 The
Louisiana Supreme Court's application of the non-delegable duty
concept in Miller strongly suggests that both New Orleans and
HANO may be liable for the negligent conduct of any contractor
who failed to remediate the Agriculture Street Landfill site (even
when the risk of harm to the residents, especially children21 0 and
former residents, is too great to transfer it to the contractors).
It is important that lawyers and others involved in identifying
relevant toxic tort legal theories for the traditional victims of
environmental justice, the poor and racial minorities, make
creative use of the law of negligence on behalf of those plaintiffs.
An attorney might allege that HANO and New Orleans were the
proximate cause of the damage plaintiffs suffered as historical

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Miller v. Martin, 838 So. 2d 761, 768 (La. 2003).
Id. (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214, cmt. b (1958)).
Id.

209. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW

OF TORTS § 71, at 512 (5th ed. 1984)).
210. See id. (finding that a master may be liable for the actions of his or her
servants regardless of whether the servants are acting within the scope of
employment).
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residents of the old Agricultural Street Landfill site because of a
failure to adequately develop the site in the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, the tort concepts of non-delegable duty and exceptions to
the rule of no liability for the principal of an independent
contractor, along with the general law of negligence, would serve
as very useful litigation tools to hold responsible parties liable for
their failure to properly dispense post Katrina resources to the
former residents of the environmental justice community on top of
the toxic Agriculture Street Landfill.
In 2006, residents of the Agriculture Street Landfill
community do not have homes because of the floodwater damage
caused by Katrina. 21 Homes in the Agriculture Street community
are full of post-Katrina toxic mold.112 "Many of the hazardous
contaminants that triggered EPA's Superfund site designation and
were supposed to be trapped underground are now present in the
sediment." 21 3
Although sediment contamination is a typical
problem, the EPA refuses to clean up the sediment because
reconstruction money is not being spent to enable people to return
and rebuild the Agriculture Street Landfill community. 214 As one
commentator notes:
Federal spending on Hurricane Katrina is a boondoggle for
contractors and government agencies. For example, $3 million of
hurricane relief spending went to the Department of Defense for the
purchase of ammunition. This is outrageous! Meanwhile, six
months after Katrina, we still have communities that look like the
hurricane passed yesterday.215
If the supporters of environmental justice can demonstrate that
the funds intended for debris removal were not utilized to create a
reasonably safe environment, or the construction was done in a
negligent manner, the law of torts may make the Corps, the EPA,
and others liable if they negligently select a contractor who fails to
adequately remediate, remove, or otherwise handle the toxic
substances.
D. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is PotentiallyLiable
in the AgriculturalStreet Landfill Site LitigationBecause
Congress Expressly Created a Waiver of the Corps Governmental
Immunity From Liability Under CERCLA
The rationale of the United States v. New Orleans opinion
provides some useful insight into the potential liability of

211. See Greenberg, supra note 114, at 34 (plotting the steps Louisiana and

New Orleans should take post-Katrina cleanup effort).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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defendants in removing toxic debris resulting from hurricanes and
other disasters.216 In April of 1999, the court directed New Orleans
to grant the United States entrance to the Agriculture Street
Landfill site. In 2003, the United States asked the court to renew
its claim against the defendants for costs and for those civil
penalties provided for under Section 107(a) of CERCLA.217 CFI
filed a counterclaim against the Corps for recoupment against any
future costs that it may be obligated to pay as a consequence of the
United States' suit against CFI for cleanup costs connected to
cleaning the debris the Corps discarded in 1965 at the Agriculture
Street Landfill. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
the United States filed a motion to dismiss CFI's counterclaim
against the Corps on the theory that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the United States possessed sovereign
immunity.21 The court denied the motion.2"9
In United States v. New Orleans, the United States alleged
that Agriculture Street was owned, operated, or otherwise
managed during the sixty-year period by the defendants from
1909-1969. Following Hurricane Betsy's stopover in New Orleans
in 1965, the Corps acted under the authority of the Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (DRA), ° and under instruction
from the President.22 ' The Corps performed cleanup operations in
New Orleans by gathering hurricane debris and discarding a
significant share of that debris at the Agriculture Street
22
Landfill."
Beginning October 1, 1980 and ending on December
31, 2001, the EPA carried out cleanup exercises as a reaction to
discharges of hazardous substances into the environment, and
warnings that additional discharges of hazardous could come from
the Agriculture Street Landfill. During this twenty-one year
period, the Agriculture Street Landfill had been designated as a
Superfund site. The lawsuit delt with issues first presented in an
earlier case, which involved the United States seeking injunctive
relief and civil penalties against New Orleans because the city
declined to grant the United States the right of entry to the
Agricultural Street Landfill site in order to perform remediation.223
In New Orleans, the plaintiff made the argument that CFI's
counterclaim against the Corps should be dismissed because the
Corps' conduct in collecting and disposing of hurricane debris

216.
(E.D.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

United States v. New Orleans, No. 02-3618, 2003 WL 22208578, at *3
La. Sept. 19, 2003).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2000).
New Orleans, 2003 WL 22208578, at *3.
Id.
Id.
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constituted a "removal" or "response" action under the relevant
provisions of CERCLA, which places its conduct outside of the
scope of CERCLA's "limited" waiver of the government's
immunity.224 The United States also advanced the proposition
that, since the Corps engaged in its hurricane cleanup activities
under the DRA, the Corps is entitled to protection from liability for
"discretionary" functions as a federal agency.225 The United States
maintained that debris removal and dumping is a discretionary
function.
According to the court, CERCLA provides that,
"'notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law,' any person
who owned or operated, arranged for disposal or treatment, or
transported hazardous substances to a disposal site shall be liable
for costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the government
at such a site."22 Under CERCLA, "persons" are identified as
"potentially responsible parties" or PRPs. 7 Congress, in
CERCLA, defined "person" to include the United States
government.2
The federal government's liability under CERCLA is subject
to the act-of-God defense to the release, or threat of release of
hazardous substances under CERCLA. 9 However, governmental
immunity is not a defense under CERCLA. ° In United States v.
Stringfellow,"' the United States and California sued the owners
and operators of a toxic waste disposal site, the generators of
waste at the site, and the transporters of waste from the
generators to the facilities based on the releases, and threatened
release of hazardous substances. Concerned Neighbors in Action,
a group of homeowners living in the vicinity, were allowed to
intervene in the lawsuit.2 32
The defendants in Stringfellow
asserted a defense rebuking liability, arguing that the heavy
rainfall was a natural disaster constituting an act of God, and
224. Id. at *2.

225. Id.
226. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).

227. Id.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).
230. New Orleans, 2003 WL 22208578, at *2. CERCLA provides:

Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States
(including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this [Act] in the same

manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as
any nongovernmental entity, including liability under Section 9607 of

this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).

"A plain reading of the language is that the

government is subject to CERCLA liability just like any private party or
nongovernmental entity is subject to CERCLA liability." United States v. New
Orleans, 2003 WL 22208578, at *2.
231. 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

232. Id.
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therefore absolved them of any claims. The court concluded that
the rains were not the kind of "exceptional" natural phenomena
that came within the narrow scope of the act of God defense
"The rains were
provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1):'
foreseeable based on normal climatic conditions and any harm
caused by the rain could have been prevented through design of
Thus, the rains were not the
proper drainage channels."234
and
the court declared that the5
the
release,
cause
of
exclusive
rains did not establish an act-of-God defense under CERCLA.2
The message from Stringfellow is that not all toxic harm caused by
weather qualifies for the act-of-God defense under CERCLA. In
order to qualify for the act-of-God defense in toxic tort litigation
under CERCLA, the defendant must, at a minimum, demonstrate
that the climatic condition that caused the harm to the plaintiff
was unforeseeable and that, as a result, the defendant should not
be held liable.
Although governmental immunity is not a defense, the United
States has argued that the Corps' removal and disposal of
hurricane debris should be exempt from any waiver of immunity
in CERCLA because the definition of "removal" in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(23) contains the phrase "any emergency assistance which
may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act" (DRA), therefore, it should remain immune from
CERCLA liability for any action that the Corps undertakes under
authority of that act."3 The court rejected the argument made by
the United States that the Corps' removal and disposal of
hurricane debris was exempt from the waiver of immunity under
CERCLA.237 The United States also contended that the DRA
provides that the government is not liable for a claim when
engaging in either a discretionary function or duty of a federal
agency implementing the provisions of the Act.238 The U.S.
contended that because hurricane cleanup was a discretionary
function of the Corps, the federal government had not waived its
governmental immunity under the DRA.

233. Id. at 1061.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See New Orleans, 2003 WL 22208578, at *3 (rejecting the government's
argument that CERCLA liability did not apply because of the method of
removal).
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5173, 5148 (2000)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5173
(2000) (allowing the President to use Federal agencies to clear debris and
wreckage created by a major disaster); 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2000) (providing that
"the Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the
exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal
Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.").
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Assuming that the Corps' cleanup of hurricane debris may be
classified as a discretionary function of a federal agency, the
language in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) would merge with the waiver of
immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), which provides for an express
waiver of "any immunity that the United States may have under
any other statute or common law rule."2 39 For instance, in Easton
v. Gilbert Southern Corp., a federal district court held the waiver
of liability in the DRA shielded the Corps from the plaintiffs claim
that the Corps stockpiled debris from Hurricane Andrew on
Plaintiffs property for a short-term interval. 4 '
Although the
plaintiff in Easton sued the Corps for failure to remediate under
CERCLA, the case is factually distinguishable from New
Orleans."
In New Orleans, the court concluded that no
remediation activity was undertaken in Easton and that no
response costs were incurred under CERCLA and that it was not
clear the property was a hazardous waste site, despite the fact the
plaintiff alleged the Corps violated CERCLA by removing the
debris,"2 which is why the Easton court concluded the waiver of
immunity provision of CERCLA did not apply."
CERCLA superimposes liability on the Corps as a federal
agency, even if it could not be held liable for damages resulting
from its actions under waivers of liability under other statutes."
For example, under the DRA," though the Corps is not liable to
an individual whose property is damaged, or who suffers a
personal injury caused by the Corps' cleanup of hurricane debris,
this immunity from liability does not apply to the Corps' conduct
that falls within the scope of CERCLA,2 as alleged in CFI's
2 47
counterclaim in New Orleans.
Thus, once the court concluded
that the United States expressly waived its immunity from
CERCLA liability, it decided not to address CFI's argument that a
waiver of sovereign immunity was not required for a compulsory
counterclaim.'
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss CFI's
counterclaim against the Corps was denied.2 9

239. New Orleans, 2003 WL 22208578, at *3 (quoting United States v. Iron
Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1441 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3 1995)).
240. Id. at *2 (citing Easton v. Gilbert Southern Corp., No. 9400505-CIV,
1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 114525 (S.D. Fla. 1995)).
241. Id.
242. Id. at *3.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. 42 U.S.C. § 5148.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
247. New Orleans,2003 WL 22208578, at *3.

248. Id. at *4.
249. Id.
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CREATING GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY WOULD BE A USEFUL
TORT TOOL FOR POST-KATRINA SEEKERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL

JUSTICE

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one would think that
federal officials would have learned the simple lesson that,
because of its location, it is foreseeable that New Orleans is at a
high risk of seasonal flooding due to rain or hurricanes, and thus,
those federal officials would not supervise the handling or
disposing of toxic materials caused by such a disaster
irresponsibly. First, as a matter of sound public policy, federal
officials should use reasonable care in handling or disposing of
toxic materials in New Orleans in order to protect the health and
safety of the people, as well as the environment. Second, as a
matter of self-interest, federal agencies should appreciate the risk
of exposing the public to toxic substances from Katrina-related
debris and take steps to ensure protection from environmental
liability.
According to a Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) report, the federal government produces a significant risk
of impending environmental liability based on its decision to use
the reopened Old Gentilly Landfill as a disposal site for Katrinarelated toxic materials.25 The report lends credence to the claims
of environmental groups that the city-owned Old Gentilly Landfill
Site, which reopened soon after Hurricane Katrina, may develop
into a toxic and costly ecological catastrophe very similar to the old
Agriculture Street landfill catastrophe that occurred four decades
ago.25' When Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in 1965, local
officials subsequently cleared storm-related debris and deposited it
on top of the then-closed Agriculture Street Landfill. As a result,
the site was identified as a Superfund site, a label reserved for
America's most contaminated and potentially dangerous
locations .252

The Old Gentilly Landfill study raises a number of questions
about the capacity of the site to appropriately handle the massive
amounts of toxic debris it is receiving.253 The report states that
FEMA may be exposed to environmental liability through use of
the Old Gentilly Landfill site.2 " FEMA pays for Katrina-related
debris removal by employing contractors under the direction of the

250. Gordon Russell, Landfill Report Sounds Alarm: Site Could be Liability
for FEMA, It Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Feb. 10, 2006, at 1.
251. Id.
The Old Gentilly Landfill Site reopened as a landfill for
construction and demolition debris soon after Hurricane Katrina. Id.

252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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Army Corps of Engineers.255 The Old Gentilly site will probably
become an expensive mess if serious contamination is
discovered."
Those potentially responsible for the Old Gentilly Landfill
site's Katrina-related toxic release include the City of New
Orleans, the state of Louisiana,"' FEMA, the Corps, the EPA, as
well as the haulers who have delivered toxic waste to the site.2
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
approved permits for two very controversial construction and
demolition (C & D) landfills in East New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina. 25 ' First, the Old Gentilly Landfill sought a
permit for a period that exceeded two years prior to Katrina.'
Permission was approved one month after Katrina hit by avoiding
the normal requirements. 6 ' Afterwards, FEMA limited the daily
intake at the Old Gentilly Landfill because of apprehension
regarding placing a considerable amount of debris on top of an old
garbage landfill. 2
In addition, the Corps issued a permit to fill wetlands at the
Chef Menteur C & D Disposal site approximately 1.6 miles from
the Vietnamese community of Village de L'Est.2"
But,
environmentalists maintain that New Orleans already has
adequate capacity to handle all eighteen million cubic yards of
Katrina-related waste without creating any new landfills." "Two
previous efforts for landfills in the Village de L'Est area were
stopped because of zoning. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin used
an emergency order to change the zoning to allow the new Chef
Menteur site."" Critics contend that Louisiana's DEQ and the
Corps failed to consider public input before making decisions
255. Id.

256. Id.
257. Id.

Gordon Russell reported the view of a New Orleans attorney

regarding the state's responsibility:
I'm more than ever convinced we're doing the right thing in trying to
close this landfill," said Joel Waltzer, an attorney for the Louisiana

Environmental Action Network, which has filed a suit against the
Louisiana Department

of Environmental

Quality that seeks the

revocation of the landfill's permit. "This validates all the concerns we
had. The fact that DEQ hadn't looked at all of these issues prior to
deciding to allow the hurricane debris to be placed at Old Gentilly is

nothing short of outrageous.
Id.
258. Id.
259. Need for Debris Removal Thumps Objections of N.O. East Residents,
BATON ROUGE ADvoc., May 8, 2006, at A6.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
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regarding the landfills." Nevertheless, by April of 2006, officials
had decided several tons of Katrina-related waste would be
dumped at the new Chef Menteur site on the swampy eastern edge
of New Orleans. 6 '
More than 1,000 Vietnamese-American families live in
Village de L'est, less than two miles from the edge of the Chef
Menteur site.2" These families are not happy about having the
remains of the Katrina disaster in their backyard.269
"Environmental groups are also angry, accusing local and federal
officials of ignoring or circumventing their own regulations, long
after the immediate emergency has ended."" ' They also argue and
warn that the same thing happened after Hurricane Betsy in
1965, and as a result, the Agriculture Street Landfill wound up
becoming a Superfund site."' Similar to a number of disputes that
have occurred since Katrina, the Chef Menteur clash involves
politics, money, history, and race.'
As a result of governmental
conduct since Katrina, almost all Louisianans now seem to share a
distrust of the government." ' In New Orleans, the VietnameseAmerican families of Village de L'est are particularly angry at
Mayor C. Ray Nagin, an African American who, in February of
2006, exercised emergency powers to put aside zoning regulations
for the Chef Menteur landfill.2 4 "Maybe we're not the right kind of
people he wanted to return," said the Reverend Vien Nguyen, the
pastor of Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church and a chief
organizer in the battle against the Chef Menteur Landfill, which
opened on April 26, 2006.275 "Asked if he meant that the mayor did
not want the Vietnamese in New Orleans, he replied, 'You got
it."

2

"

Adam Babich, director of the Tulane Environmental Law

Clinic, observed that public officials in New Orleans and the State
of Louisiana have never been attentive about complying with
environmental regulations; however, they have been especially
lenient since
Katrina.7
This laidback attitude toward
environmental health and safety is most apparent when it comes

266. Id.
267. Leslie Eaton, Katrina's Debris Fuels a Politicaland Ethnic Fight, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., May 9, 2006, at 2. Tens of thousands of houses destroyed by
Hurricane Katrina are waiting to be gutted or bulldozed. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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to landfills, according to Babich. 8 The potential toxic tort liability
exposure for a Louisiana agency that breaches its duty to protect
environmental health and safety by giving very relaxed approval
to dump toxic waste in an unsafe landfill is very great. Relevant
Louisiana and New Orleans agencies have a duty to comply with
their own environmental health and safety law rather than use
the post-Katrina debris cleanup as pretext to avoid complying with
environmental regulations designed to protect people from toxic
exposure.
Plaintiffs who can establish a breach of duty on the part of a
relevant governmental agency may seek recovery from that agency
under negligence theory provided by state law.279 In deciding
whether a plaintiff may succeed on a negligence claim, Louisiana
courts use a duty-risk analysis. 8 ° A duty-risk analysis consists of
five elements that the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant had a
duty to obey a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the
defendant failed to comply with the required specific standard (the
breach element); (3) the defendant's substandard behavior was a
cause-in-fact of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff (the cause-infact element); (4) the defendant's substandard behavior was the
legal cause of the harm suffered by the plaintiff (the scope of
liability element); and (5) the defendant's conduct caused the
plaintiff to suffer actual damages (the damages element)."l A
proper duty-risk analysis first requires recognizing a duty
required of the defendant either by statute or rule of law, and
second, singling out the behavior of the defendant that breached
that duty. 82
In the near future, toxic torts plaintiffs in New Orleans will
be able to establish they have suffered an injury because of the
breach by local, state, or federal agencies of the duty to enforce
environmental regulations regarding the post-Katrina use of a
landfill in the New Orleans area. After the reasonably foreseeable
toxic discharges occur as a result of Katrina related waste, postKatrina plaintiffs should argue that proper good faith by postKatrina public officials to enforce relevant pre-Katrina
environmental regulations for landfill debris disposal would have
prevented the toxic discharges.

278. Id.
279. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. ART. 2315 (2005) (providing that "every act" by
a person that causes damage to another obligates them to "repair it.").
280. See Long v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 916 So. 2d 87 (La.

2005)

(involving

a wrongful

death

action

against

Department

of

Transportation and Development (DOTD) based on a collision at a railway

crossing to recover damages for breach of duty to properly signal the railway
crossing).
281. Id. at 101.
282. Id.
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In July of 2006, the DEQ promised to follow the
recommendations of New Orleans officials regarding the future of
the contentious Chef Menteur site." Yet, DEQ officials rejected
the claim that the landfill is unsafe.' In a strongly worded letter
to Mayor Ray Nagin, a DEG official gave notice that closing the
landfill would impair the city's recovery from Hurricane Katrina
and may cause the city to spend substantially more money. 281
Opponents of the Chef Menteur landfill, however, assert that two
recently issued scientific reports support the contention that the
landfill is environmentally unsafe. The reports contend that the
landfill is a hazard because it contains hazardous household
wastes as well as inactive construction and demolition debris.286
The location of the landfill, specifically its proximity to residential
neighborhoods with high minority populations, has also sparked
environmental justice concerns: "Village de l'Est is a mostly
Vietnamese-American community, and much of eastern New
Orleans is majority African American."287
Mayor Nagin issued an executive order in February of 2006,
opening the Chef Menteur site on the basis of an emergency
situation in order to expedite the removal of Hurricane Katrina
debris. On July 13, 2006, the mayor announced that he would not
renew the executive order when it expires on August 14, 2006.8
In response, DEQ Assistant Secretary Chuck Carr Brown said the
DEQ "will revoke its temporary authorization for the Chef
Menteur facility to operate.""
Brown made it clear that he
strongly opposes Nagin's decision to close the Chef Menteur site.'
"'We feel it is our responsibility to [provide notice] of the potential
consequences, including significantly impeding disaster clean-up
and recovery' for New Orleans" if the Chef Menteur site is
closed."
Brown believes closing the Chef Menteur landfill will
increase illegal dumping in Orleans Parish as well as increase
costs and cause delays because Katrina debris will have to be
trucked to landfills farther away. Opponents of the Chef Menteur
landfill contend Brown's advice is exaggerated because, with
proper planning, other landfills in New Orleans have the capacity
to take in the large amount of debris generated by Katrina. 92 Joel
Waltzer, an attorney who represents the Louisiana Environmental
283. Bruce Eggler, DEQ Will Abide by Landfill Decision but Closing Site is a
Mistake, Official Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, July 26, 2006, at 1.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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Action Network and the Coalition for a Strong New Orleans East,
said his clients agree with the decision to close the Chef Menteur
landfill.29
Waltzer accuses the DEQ of failing "to address real
concerns raised by the scientific community" concerning the true
safety of the landfill at Chef Menteur.'
John Pardue, director of the Louisiana Water Resources
Research Institute at LSU, said DEQ must establish stricter
standards for debris landfills in order to "meaningfully protect the
environment and surrounding communities."29
The DEQ must
require more rigorous tests than the June 2006 tests the DEQ
used to conclude that the Chef Menteur landfill is actually safe,
Pardue said.'
Indeed, an investigation of the Chef Menteur
landfill by LSU geologist and hydrologist Paul Kemp led him to
recommend that "fairly continuous pumping" was needed at the
site to stop contaminated groundwater from escaping."
Those who wage the environmental justice battle on behalf of
those exposed to toxic harms due to Hurricane Katrina-related
debris in landfills and elsewhere must not forget to frame their
basic battle for environmental justice in terms of the legal duty
that negligence law, as well as state and federal law, impose on
those involved with handling toxic debris. Although litigation may
not be enough to advance the greatest amount of environmental
justice for the victims of environmental racism, it can serve as the
starting point of a good fight. Compelling evidence reveals that
public officials in Louisiana breached the duty owed to the general
public to protect health and safety by unnecessarily exposing
residents to toxic harms. Litigating toxic torts claims in New
Orleans is a necessary endeavor until lawmakers adopt
responsible public policies that will protect our most vulnerable
citizens from reasonably foreseeable acts of injustice caused by
toxic harms. Where the government has waived its immunity to
liability in toxic torts litigation, those attacking environmental
injustice in post-Katrina New Orleans must not hesitate to use the
courthouse as a proper venue for justice when public officials are
otherwise reluctant to protect the environmental health of
residents in the New Orleans area.
CONCLUSION
An editorial written by Professor Hari Osofsky in the
Register-Guard vividly and accurately describes how Hurricane
Katrina exposed the preexisting environmental injustice that
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existed in New Orleans.298 Less than ten days after Hurricane
Katrina struck New Orleans on August 29, 2005, Professor
Osofsky demonstrated an excellent understanding of the
environmental injustice policy issues raised by Katrina's impact.
According to Professor Osofsky, the majority of citizens who felt
the strongest adverse effects were African American. Residents
looking for shelter in the New Orleans Superdome as Katrina
approached, crying over drowned relatives, and walking in toxic
waters were predominately African American."
Hurricane
Katrina placed America's environmental justice failure on
international display. Poor African Americans have suffered
unreasonably from exposure to toxic substances in the postKatrina environment because of a combination of environmental,
social and economic injustice."' Notwithstanding advance
knowledge of the approaching hurricane, New Orleans residents
who were too poor to leave the city were not evacuated, but instead
were given less than adequate housing in the Superdome and
Convention Center. 01 Yet, experts might take years to decide who
is to blame for this failure.02
The convergence of injustices displayed in Katrina's
aftermath is not exclusive to natural disasters.0 3 The U.S. Council
on Environmental Quality Studies acknowledged the unequal
allocation of environmental benefits and burdens. 4 A lack of
personal funds, as well as racial discrimination in housing, often
keep the poor and racial minorities from preventing the toxic
substance producers from dumping in their back yard.00 Efforts to
correct these inequities face many challenges,3" as evidenced when
Tulane Law School's Environmental Clinic was severely criticized
because it assisted low-income, African-American community
challenges to the location proposed by a chemical plant.0 '
Nevertheless, until national, state and local policymakers are
ready to adopt effective public policies that protect the poor from
predictable environmental injustices, it is indeed both proper and
necessary to stand up for the victims of post-Katrina toxic
exposure injustice with litigation. I only wish we had public
298. Hari Osofsky, Katrina Disaster Exposes Environmental Injustice, THE
REGISTER-GUARD,
Eugene Oregon,
Sept. 7,
2005, available at
http://www.registerguard.com/news/2005/09/07/ed.col.olofsky.0907.pl.php?sect
ion=opinion.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.

40

The John MarshallLaw Review

[40:1

policymakers wise enough to take proactive measures to protect
citizens from unreasonable toxic exposure and encourage
responsible disposal of toxic debris generated by Katrina. If big
businesses understood that protecting the community from
unreasonable toxic exposure, while disposing of toxic debris
related to Katrina, is good for business in the long run, New
Orleans would be a much safer environment for families to return
to today.

